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In this paper, I develop a differential insider-outsider game in which a union of cor-
porative incumbents chooses the wage of its members by taking into account the optimal
employment policy of a firm that, in turn, is assumed to decide the number of outsiders
to hire in a spot labour market. Under the assumption that incumbents cannot be fired
and commit themselves to a given path of wages, I demonstrate that such a game displays
an open-loop Stackelberg equilibrium in which the initial stock of insiders pins down the
trajectories of incumbents, entrants and insider wages. Moreover, resorting to numerical
simulations, I show that adjustments towards the steady-state equilibrium occur through
asymmetric oscillations that mimic the decline of union membership and union wage pre-
mia observed in the US all over the last twenty years. In addition, I show that the model
provides a positive relationship between the labour market power of the insider union and
the impatience of the firm.
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1 Introduction
The insider-outsider theory of employment and unemployment rests on the assumption that
there is a fundamental asymmetry in the wage setting process between incumbent workers
(insiders) and unemployed workers who are looking for a job (outsiders). On the one side,
relying on labour turnover costs and/or firm-specific skills that may create a productivity
premium, insiders are assumed to be endowed with a strong bargaining power in the wage
setting process – sometimes strengthened via formal or informal unions – and to exploit this
power in order to maximize their pay and foster their employment opportunities. On the other
side, outsiders are assumed to have no market power and when they have the chance to find a
job, unless they become insiders, their wage is usually quite close to the reservation level and
they have no say over their employment prospects.
Undoubtedly, the main backers of the insider-outsider theory are Lindbeck and Snower
(1984, 1989, 2002) who developed a long array of works that uncover a wide range of conse-
quences in terms of wages and (un)employment triggered by the interest conflict established
between insiders and outsiders in the labour market. Relying on that conflict, the two authors
provide a sound rationale for a number of puzzling stylized facts that characterized the macroe-
conomic experience of Western economies during the 80s and the 90s such as the existence and
persistence of involuntary unemployment, the inflexibility of insiders’ wages, trade union cor-
poratism and the asymmetry of wage-employment movements observed during recessions and
expansions.1
In the latest survey article dedicated to the theoretical approach that they contributed
to start, Lindbeck and Snower (2002) point out that one of the most complex and still open
question of the insider-outsider theory is the way in which employment and wages move through
time in response to labour market shocks. Specifically, while there are several insider-outsider
contributions that show how to fix the levels of employment and wages at any point in time,
dynamic insider-outsider models – despite some fair exceptions – lag somehow behind. Similarly,
in another survey, Sanfey (1995) argues that modifying traditional union models to consider
the distinction between insiders and outsiders is straightforward, but that task is actually much
more complicated in dynamic models.
In confirmation of the arguments recalled above, the dynamic insider-outsider literature
counts a limited number of contributions. For instance, Solow (1985) outlines a two-period
insider-outsider model but he is mainly concerned about what happens in the first and he does
not derive any explicit dynamic law for employment and wages.2 Drazen and Gottfries (1990)
1In the same years, other prominent authors contributed to that theory. For example, Carruth and Oswald
(1987) provided a model of union behaviour grounded on the distinction between insider and outsider workers
and discussed some related macroeconomic implications such as the possibility that productivity improvements
can feed into pure wage increases for insiders with no, or minor, effects on employment. Furthermore, Blanchard
and Summers (1986) as well as Gottfries and Horn (1987) relied on insider-outsider relations to explain the strong
persistence of unemployment observed in European countries during the 80’s.
2Recognizing the inherent dynamic of the insider-outsider hypothesis, a similar exercise is carried out by
Vetter and Andersen (1994).
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set forth a dynamic optimizing insider-outsider framework developed over an infinite horizon,
but they model the evolution of wages and employment by means of few discrete realizations
of the two variables. Huizinga and Schiantarelli (1992) develop a discrete-time model in which
a firm and an insider union efficiently bargain over the wage and employment but the two
authors focus only on the path of employment adjustments driven by productivity shocks.
Fukuda and Owen (2008) build a series of overlapping-generations (OLG) models with human
capital accumulation in which the insider-outsider dichotomy is conveyed in terms of firm-
specific versus general skills.3 More recently, Gal̀ı (2016) sets forth a New Keynesian DSGE
model with an insider-outsider labour market by exploring the implications of that environment
for the design of optimal monetary policies when unemployment is strongly persistent.
To the best of my knowledge, the present contribution is the first attempt to provide a
dynamic insider-outsider model developed within an optimal control framework with continuous
time and infinite horizon. Specifically, I build a parsimonious differential game in which a
corporative union of insider workers whose members cannot be fired is called in to choose
the common wage trajectory of incumbents by taking into account the optimal employment
path selected by a representative profit-maximizing firm that, in turn, is assumed to decide
the number of outsiders – or entrants – to hire in each instant on a spot labour market. In
detail, in my game new hirings boost union membership at a fixed rate and newly hired workers
are assumed to be costly for recruiting entrepreneurs. Furthermore, the reservation wage of
outsiders as well as the redundancy rate of insiders are taken as exogenously given.
Within that strategic framework, the dynamic interaction between the decisions of the firm
and the ones of the union describes how wages and employment are continuously determined
and move through time in a typical insider-outsider economy. In my proposal, the labour input
of incumbents follows a stock-adjustment process and its marginal cost – the insider wage –
evolves according to the preferences of unionized workers who are in the position to manipulate
the recruiting decisions of the entrepreneur without caring about the welfare of unemployed
people.
The theoretical insider-outsider setting developed in this paper differs from recent dynamic
union models with bargaining in many directions. For instance, consistently with the search-
and-matching framework with a monopoly union set forth by Krusell and Rudanko (2016), the
union of insiders described in my differential game embodies in its optimization problem an
intertemporal constraint that conveys the optimal hiring decisions of the representative firm.
From a dynamic perspective, this feature is at odds with respect DSGE models with wage
bargaining such as Mattesini and Rossi (2008, 2009) and Zanetti (2007) in which unions act as
static Stackelberg leaders that do not consider the effects of their optimal wage trajectory on
the dynamic path of hirings decided by employers.
Other distinguishing marks of my dynamic insider-outsider model are the definition of union
membership as well as the treatment of labour inputs. On the one hand, as opposed to Morin
3Different OLG models in which the insider-outsider distinction is concerned are given by McCausland (1998)
and Begg (1988).
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(2017), Krusell and Rudanko (2016), Alvarez and Shimer (2014), Zanetti (2007) and Delacroix
(2006), union members do not include unemployed workers. Obviously, at the firm level, this
makes a sharp distinction between internal and external workers.4 On the other hand, the
labour input employed by the firm is split in two distinct components, i.e. the insider and the
entrant labour force that are not perfectly substitutable for employers. The former follows a
stock-adjustment principle whose inflows are not described by a matching function as in Morin
(2017), Krusell and Rudanko (2016) and Trigari (2006), but are given instead by the fixed
share of entrants that join the insider union. The latter is a flow variable that represents newly
hired workers who suffer a productivity gap with respect to incumbents. Such a particular
characterization deserves to be stressed since Alvarez and Shimer (2014), Mattesini and Rossi
(2008, 2009) and Zanetti (2006, 2007) treat labour input as a single flow variable under the
control of employers. In addition, the insider union described in this paper is assumed to set a
smooth wage trajectory without relying on any exogenous minimum wage – or wage norm – as
is done instead in Alvarez and Shimer (2014), Mattesini and Rossi (2008, 2009) and Delacroix
(2006).
The results of my theoretical exploration can be summarized as follows. First, under the
assumption that the union of insiders commits itself to a given path of wages and behaves
in an egalitarian manner, I demonstrate that the dynamic insider-outsider model economy
displays an open-loop Stackelberg equilibrium in which the initial stock of insiders pins down the
trajectories of incumbents, entrants and insider wages in a well-determined manner (cf. Dockner
et al. 2000). Moreover, resorting to numerical simulations, I show that in the dynamic model
under investigation adjustments towards the unique steady-state equilibrium occur through
damped asymmetric oscillations that mirrors the parallel decline of union membership and
union wage premia observed in the US over the last twenty years (cf. Blanchflower and Bryon,
2004). According to the logic underlying the game played by the workers and the firm, this
pattern is a direct implication of the optimal behaviour of unionized insiders that extract rents
from entrepreneurs subject to firing limitations (cf. Alvarez and Shimer, 2014; Krusell and
Rudanko, 2016). In addition, consistently with models of dynamic bargaining, I show that my
intertemporal insider-outsider framework delivers a positive equilibrium relationship between
the labour market power of the union and the degree of impatience of the firm (cf. Binmore et
al. 1986; Osborne and Rubinstein, 1990).
The paper is arranged as follows. Section 2 develops the theoretical model. Section 3
explores its numerical properties. Finally, Section 4 concludes.
4In Morin (2017) union members are either employed or unemployed. When contracting the wage, however,
the union considers only the surplus of employed workers because their fall back utility is assumed to coincide
with the welfare of unemployed individuals. Therefore, similarly to Huizinga and Schiantarelli (1992), the
bargaining process proceeds by weighting the surplus of insiders and the one of the firm.
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2 The model
I consider a model economy in which time is continuous and the time horizon is infinite. Within
this economy, in each instant – say t – a representative firm starts with a pool of LI (t) insider
workers and it must decide how many outsiders have to be hired in a spot labour market by
bearing the implied hiring costs.
Winking at the hypothesis of static insider-outsider models in which fully-fledged employees
set their wage as high as possible consistent with their continued employment, I assume that
insiders cannot be fired by the firm (cf. Lindbeck and Snower, 1987). Thereafter, following
Huizinga and Schiantarelli (1992), I make the hypothesis that incumbents may lose their job
at the exogenously given rate b that determines the outflows from employment. By contrast,
inflows into employment are given by newly hired workers – or entrants – denoted by LE (t).
According to Booth (1984), individuals usually join a union only when the expected utility
from so doing exceeds the utility from not joining. Similarly, Jones and McKenna (1994) argue
that employed workers join a union if the marginal benefit of protection is at least as great
as union dues. Aiming at placing entrants and outsiders on the same level and skipping the
modelling of workers’ preferences, in this paper I assume that a fixed fraction m of outsiders
becomes insiders just immediately after their appointment while the remaining become unem-
ployed.5 Consequently, the dynamic evolution of the stock of incumbent workers can be written
as
·
LI (t) = mLE (t)− bLI (t) 0 < m < 1, 0 < b < 1 (1)
The expression in (1) implicitly defines the way in which outsiders turn into insiders and
reveals that the hiring decision of the firm have a direct influence on the evolution of the stock
of seasoned workers. In that differential equation, the existence of a positive job-destruction
rate for incumbents is a prerequisite for the derivation of a stationary solution in which both
LI (t) and LE (t) are positive and constant over time. Moreover, eq. (1) has the convenient
property that in steady-state the proportion of insiders on the whole labour force employed
by the firm is fixed at m/ (m+ b) < 1. Interestingly, when m = b, i.e. when the fraction of
outsiders that become insiders in each instant is equal to the internal job destruction rate, the
steady-state equilibrium is characterized by an equal number of entrants and insiders.
With regard to the production technology, similarly to Guerrazzi (2011), I assume that
produced output is a quadratic combination of the employed labour force. Therefore, under the
hypothesis that the flow of entrants is less productive than the stock of insiders, the production
function of the representative firm is given by








A > 0, 0 < φ < 1, α > 0 (2)
5An alternative hypothesis could be to assume that workers who do not become unionized remain employed
without the benefits of union membership. The exploration of that assumption under which outsiders become
a distinct state variable in addition to the stock of insiders is left to future developments.
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where Y (t) is the level of output, A is a measure of the total factor productivity (TFP), φ
measures the productivity differential between insiders and outsiders whereas α is a parameter
that conveys the slope of the marginal productivity for the two categories of workers.
The quadratic specification in eq. (2) has the virtue to deliver linear marginal produc-
tivity schedules both for insiders and outsiders whose distance is proportional to the param-
eter φ. Indeed, straightforward differentiation reveals that ∂Y (t) /∂LI (t) = A − LI (t) and
∂Y (t) /∂LE (t) = φA− LE (t). As argued by Lindbeck and Snower (1987), the wedge between
the productivity of the two different categories of workers – together with labour turnover costs
– provides a measure of the underlying degree of insiderness (cf. Manzini and Snower, 2002).
Moreover, eq. (2) reveals that the marginal productivity of insiders is independent of the one
of outsiders and vice versa, i.e. ∂2Y (t) / (∂LI (t) ∂LE (t)) = ∂
2Y (t) / (∂LE (t) ∂LI (t)) = 0.
Consistently with the hypothesis that the union behaves in a corporative manner with the
aim of protecting the positions of its members, such a pattern precludes any form of work
collaboration between insiders and outsiders (cf. Lindbeck and Snower, 1988). In addition,
from an empirical point of view, the expression in eq. (2) implies that the elastiticities of
output with respect the two labour inputs – respectively, ǫY,LI ≡ LI (t) (A− LI (t)) /Y (t) and
ǫY,LE ≡ LE (t) (φA− LE (t)) /Y (t) – are not constant and this fact appears more consistent
with the most recent attempts to estimate actual production functions (cf. Ackerberg et al.
2015).
Denoting by wE > 0 the exogenously given reservation wage that has to be paid to outsider
workers, the picture of the instantaneous marginal productivity of the two kinds of workers





øA/ A/ LI(t), LE(t)
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Figure 1: Marginal productivity of insiders and outsiders
The diagram in Figure 1 reveals some interesting features of the marginal productivity of
the insiders and the one of the outsiders. Specifically, the former crosses wE in B and displays
a trade-off between the profitability of incumbents and their level of employment. The latter
crosses wE in C and reveals that in the spot labour market there is only one allocation in
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which the productivity of entrants coincides with their wage. In this regard, the exogeneity of
the reservation wage means that labour supply for new applicants is perfectly elastic so that
paying wE the firm can potentially hire all the outsiders that it wants. Moreover, together
with the fixed transformation rate m, that feature qualifies this setting as a partial equilibrium
model in which the underlying dynamics is not affected by capital accumulation (cf. Huizinga
and Schiantarelli, 1992; Mattesini and Rossi, 2008, 2009). In the remainder of the paper, I
will assume that the information conveyed by the two linear schedules depicted in Figure 1 is
common knowledge both for workers and the firm. Furthermore, I will consider a situation in
which the marginal productivity of outsiders is always above their reservation wage. Formally
speaking, as it actually happens in the graph of Figure 1, I will make the hypothesis that
Aφ > wE.
As I mentioned in the introduction, insider workers are assumed to be organized in an
internal labour union whose task is to set the real wage of its members in an egalitarian
manner by taking into account the hiring decisions of the firm.6 Along the lines of Dertouzos
and Pencavel (1981) and Pencavel (1985), I consider the case in which the preferences of the
union are given by a log-linear function such as
U (LI (t) , wI (t)) ≡ β log (LI (t)) + (1− β) log (wI (t)) 0 < β < 1 (3)
where β (1− β) measures the relative weight of employment (wage) in the union preferences.
The existing literature on wage determination does not provide exhaustive insights on how
to model the objective function of a union (cf. Farber, 1986; Gahan, 2002; Kaufman, 2002).
As argued by Jones and McKenna (1994), however, it seems reasonable to assume that a
union of insiders should care – among other things – about the attained level of membership
and the wage earned by its members. Accordingly, eq. (3) implies that the union suffers a
loss (experiences a gain) when the stock of incumbent workers decreases (the insider wage
increases) whose magnitude does not depend on wI (t) (LI (t)). In that expression, a value of β
higher (lower) than 1/2 means that the insider union is employment-oriented (wage-oriented)
(cf. Sanfey, 1995; Mattesini and Rossi, 2008, 2009).
The employment component of the union welfare function in eq. (3) deserves some additional
remarks. First, the fact the union cares about the level of its membership can be taken as a
feature that mirrors its political objectives; indeed, larger organizations are usually assumed to
have a stronger ascendancy in the decisional processes in which they are involved (cf. Becker,
1983). In that direction, the union concern about LI (t) can provide a rationale for its role of
leader played in the differential game under scrutiny. Second, since I’m assuming that insiders
cannot be fired, the expression in eq. (3) avoids the kinks and discontinuities in the union welfare
that are typical in static insider-outsider models (cf. Carruth and Oswald, 1987). Furthermore,
confirming the corporative attitude of incumbents, eq. (3) straightforwardly reveals that the
6As argued by Drazen and Gottfries (1990), one may think of a union which organizes an industry and that
is large relative to firms in that industry. Delacroix (2006) defines a union with the features assumed in this
paper as ‘monolithic’.
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welfare of outsiders is given no weight in the preferences of unionized workers.
2.1 The problem of the firm
Consistently with Solow (1985), the representative risk-neutral firm is assumed to maximize
the discounted flow of its expected profit by taking the trajectory of insider wages as given but
– at the same time – considering that its hiring decisions have an impact on the dynamics of
incumbent workers, i.e. on the evolution of union’s membership. In other words, I assume that
the union of insiders is able to commit itself to a given path of wages and then it announces
its egalitarian wage policy {wI (t)}
∞
t=0 at the beginning of the game.
7 Therefore, assuming that
hiring costs have a quadratic specification such as the ones suggested by Hamermesh (1995),

















dt ρF > 0, h > 0
s.to
·
LI (t) = mLE (t)− bLI (t)
LI (0) = LI
(4)
where ρF is the discount rate of the representative firm, h is a measure of the slope of marginal
hiring costs, whereas LI > 0 is the initial number of insider workers.
Considering the production function in (2) and taking wI (t) as given, the first-order condi-
tions (FOCs) for the dynamic problem in (4) are the following:
Aφ− (α + h)LE (t)− wE +mΛ (t) = 0 (5)
·
Λ (t) = Λ (t) (b+ ρF )− A+ αLI (t) + wI (t) (6)
lim
t→∞
exp (−ρF t) Λ (t)LI (t) = 0 (7)
where Λ (t) is the costate variable on the dynamic constraint describing the evolution of insider
workers.
Eq. (5) is the FOC with respect to LE (t). Moreover, the differential equation in (6) describes
the optimal path of Λ (t), whereas (7) is the required transversality condition. Regarded as
conditions on the time path of Λ (t), eq.s (1), (5) and (6) convey the incentive compatibility
conditions of a principal-agent problem. Specifically, if the union can suggest a time path for
7The hypothesis that the union imposes an identical wage for all the insider workers can be motivated by the
broad literature documenting that unions tend to compress the distribution of wages (cf. Alvarez and Shimer,
2014; Krusell and Rudanko, 2016).
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Λ (t) such that eq.s (1), (5) and (6) are satisfied, then the optimization problem of the firm is
solved (cf. Long, 1992).
From an algebraic point of view, the FOCs of the firm problem yields LE (t) as a function
of Λ (t). Therefore, if we can find functions Λ (t) and LI (t) that satisfy eq.s. (5) and (6) as
well as the boundary condition LI (0) = LI , then the optimal open-loop strategy for the firm
is given by
LE (t) =
Aφ− wE +mΛ (t)
α + h
(8)
Eq. (8) reveals that – in each instant – a positive flow of entrants requires that Aφ+mΛ (t) >
wE. Moreover, according to eq. (8), that flow is stronger, the lower the values of α and h.
2.2 The problem of the union
Continuing the analogy with Solow (1985), the union of insider workers is assumed to set the
wage of its members as a Stackelberg leader who takes into account the fact that its membership
dynamics is influenced by firm’s hiring decisions described by eq.s (6) and (8). Otherwise said,
this means that Λ (t), i.e. the shadow value of insider employment in the firm’s problem, is
treated as a state variable in the leader’s optimization problem (cf. Dockner et al. 2000).








exp (−ρU t) (β log (LI (t)) + (1− β) log (wI (t))) dt ρU > 0
s.to
·





Λ (t) = Λ (t) (b+ ρF )− A+ αLI (t) + wI (t)
LI (0) = LI
(9)
where ρU is the discount rate of the union which is not necessarily equal to the one of the firm.
The FOCs for the problem in (9) are given by
1− β
wI (t)
+ Ψ (t) = 0 (10)
·











exp (−ρU t) Γ (t)LI (t) = lim
t→∞
exp (−ρU t)Ψ (t) Λ (t) = 0 (13)
where Γ (t) and Ψ (t) are, respectively, the costate variable on the dynamic constraint describing
the evolution of union membership and the costate variable on Λ (t).
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Again, eq. (10) is the FOC with respect to wI (t). Moreover, the differential equations in
(11) and (12) define, respectively, the optimal path of Γ (t) and Ψ (t), whereas (13) are the
required transversality conditions.
Exploiting the result in eq. (10), the solution of the union problem provides the following
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The differential equations in (15) and (16) show that the dynamics of LE and wI over time
is proportional to the evolution of, respectively, Λ and Ψ. Moreover, eq. (16) has the intriguing
implication that when the union does not care about the wage of its members, i.e., when
β → 1, the optimal value of wI tends to be constant over time. Consequently, the employment
orientation of the insider union straightforwardly leads to the inflexibility of the insider wage
(cf. Lindbeck and Snower, 1984; 1987).
Now, it is worth noting the following important result:
Lemma 1: The value of Λ(0) is controllable by the union so that the union itself is able to
control the solution of the firm problem.
Proof: See the Appendix.
Whenever Λ(0) is controllable by the union, its value cannot be determined independently
of the leader’s control path of wI (t). From an economic point of view, this means that in each
instant the union of internal workers is able to set an insider wage that leads the firm to hire the
number of entrants that is in the best interest of the welfare trajectory of the union itself. In a
dynamic perspective, this feature summarizes the essence of the insider-outsider dilemma (cf.
Lindbeck and Snower, 1984). In order to achieve that remarkable outcome, the initial value of
the costate variable of the union problem associated to Λ(t) has to be set to zero (cf. Dockner
et al. 2000). Obviously, this means that the FOCs of the union problem must be supplemented
by the following transversality condition:
Ψ(0) = 0 (17)
The transversality condition in (17) has two important implications for the union problem.
First, plugging (17) into eq. (10), allows us to state that in the initial stage of the differential
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game, and in that stage only, the union – exactly as it would do in a static environment – sets
a wage that leads its marginal gain from a wage increase to zero. With log-linear preferences,
this means that at the outset of the game the union sets an explosive wage. Intuitively, since
it knows that the stock of incumbents is immune from firing, the union tries to set the wage
of its members as high as possible to appropriate rents from the firm. This means that at the
beginning of the game the union is wage-oriented no matter the shape of its preferences, i.e. no
matter the value of β. Thereafter, in the subsequent instants, the union tunes the level of wI
in order to make profitable for the firm to hiring a level of LE that fulfils its optimal trajectory
of membership.
To some extent, the result on controllability echoes the one achieved in the search-and-
matching model set forth by Krusell and Rudanko (2016) where – under wage commitment – a
positive starting level of incumbents leads the union of workers to hiking up wages by creating
a distortion in the optimal hiring decisions of the firm. Moreover, taking into account that
the initial stock of incumbents is given, i.e. LI (0) = LI , the transverality condition in eq.
(17) implies that the saddle-path determinacy of the 4× 4 dynamic system in (14) requires the
existence of two negative roots.
2.3 Steady state










Ψ(t) = 0. The elements of that
set collect allocations in which the insider wage is stable over time and – in each instant –
the number of hired outsiders that join the union is equal to the number of retiring insiders,
respectively, w∗I = − (1− β) /Ψ
∗ and L∗E = (b/m)L
∗
I .
From a formal point of view, the derivation of {L∗I ,Λ
∗,Γ∗,Ψ∗} can be done in four simple
steps. First, setting
·






where M0 ≡ (α + h) (ρU − (ρF + b)).
Second, setting
·
Γ (t) = 0 in eq. (11) and plugging the result into eq. (18) allows us to write





where M1 ≡ (ρU + b)M0.
Third, setting
·
Λ (t) = 0 in eq. (6) and plugging the results into eq.s. (10) and (19), Λ∗ can
be written as
Λ∗ =
Aβm2 + ((1− β) (M1 − αm
2)− αβm2)L∗I





LI (t) = 0 in eq. (1) and plugging the results into eq.s (8) and (20) allows us
to derive in an unequivocal manner the steady-state level of the insider labour force. Specifically,
L∗I =
βm ((Aφ− wE) (ρF + b) + Am)
bβ (α + h) (b+ ρF )− (1− β) (M1 − αm2) + αβm2
(21)
Plugging the expression in eq. (21) into eq.s (19) and (20) leads to the determination of the
unique steady-state solution of the dynamic system in (14) as well as to pegging the equilibrium
pair {w∗I , L
∗
E}.
Eq.s (18) − (21) are useful to show how the stationary solution of the game is affected
by changes in the values of the main parameters’ model. Specifically, while the consequences
implied by different values of the two discount rates are discussed below by means of some
numerical examples, the effects driven by variations of A, φ, β, h, and m on the equilibrium




I} are described in the following Propositions:
Proposition 1: Higher (lower) productivity levels, i.e. higher (lower) values of A, of φ or





Proposition 2: The higher (weaker) the employment orientation of the union, i.e. the
higher (lower) the values of β, the higher (lower) the values of L∗I and L
∗
E and the lower (higher)
the values of w∗I .
Proposition 3: An increase (reduction) in marginal hiring costs, i.e. an increase (reduc-





Proposition 4: Higher (lower) values of the transformation rate of outsiders into insiders,




While the results in Propositions 1 and 2 are trivial, the ones in Propositions 3 and 4 require
some explanation.8 In the first place, the effects driven by changes in h described in Proposition
3 are at odds with respect to what happens in a static insider-outsider model where – consis-
tently with a short-run perspective – higher (lower) turnover costs usually allow incumbents
to negotiate higher (lower) wage payments (e.g. Lindbeck and Snower, 1987; Coe and Snower,
1997). The rationale for this opposite finding is that, everything else being equal, higher (lower)
hiring costs discourage (encourage) the firm from recruiting (to hire) new entrants. In the long-
run, this in turn will reduce (increase) the stock of incumbent workers as well as the output
produced by the firm. Obviously, the lower (higher) the output of the firm, the lower (higher)
the insider wage.
Moreover, the explanation of the results in Proposition 4 is quite similar to the one underly-
ing Proposition 3. Specifically, the higher (lower) the number of entrants who become insiders
in each instant, the lower (higher) the incentive for the firm to hire new employees; indeed,
8The only thing to notice about Proposition 2 is that when union do not care about its membership, i.e.
when β → 0, the stationary solution for the insider wage cannot be determined.
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once unionized, entrants will have to be paid more than their reservation wage.9 In addition,
the larger (lower) the stock of incumbents, the lower (higher) its marginal productivity and the
lower (higher) the insider wage.
2.4 Local dynamics
Given the quadruplet {L∗I ,Λ
∗,Γ∗,Ψ∗} derived above, the local dynamics of the model economy
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2
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Denoting with λi, with i = {1, 2, 3, 4}, the eigenvalues of the Jacobian matrix in (22), the
corresponding characteristic equation of the linearized dynamic system can be written as
λ4 − 2ρUλ
3 +
(ρU (ρF + ρU)− ρ
2
F − 2b (b+ ρF )) (α + h)− 2αm
2
α + h
λ2 +∆1λ+∆2 +∆3 (23)
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where F ≡ α + h and G ≡ b+ ρU .
Considering that the trace of the Jacobian matrix in (22) is equal to 2ρU > 0 – and imple-
menting the analytical and numerical results derived by Kempt et al. (1980), Dockner (1985)
and Dockner and Feichtinger (1991) to the expressions in (23) and (24) – it becomes possible
to state that the steady-state allocation {L∗I ,Λ
∗,Γ∗,Ψ∗} is a saddle-point characterized by two
negative complex conjugate roots, say λ1 and λ2, as well as two positive real roots, say λ3 and
λ4.
10 Consequently, the two convergent eigenvalues of the linear system in (22) can be written,
respectively, as λ1 = Re (λ1)+Im (λ1) i and λ2 = Re (λ2)−Im (λ2) i, with Re (λ1) = Re (λ2) < 0
whereas Im (λ1) = Im (λ2). Obviously, Re (λk) (Im (λk)) is the real (imaginary) part of λk, with
k = {1, 2}.
In the situation under scrutiny, there is only one trajectory that satisfies the dynamic system
in (14) that converges to the steady-state whereas all the others diverge. Strictly speaking, in the
9Along these lines, it is worth noting that higher (lower) values of m lead to an increase (reduction) of the
equilibrium unionization rate.
10The quadratic production function of the firm and the log-linear preferences of the union rule out the
possibility of limit cycles.
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proposed dynamic insider-outsider model the equilibrium path is locally determinate, i.e. taking




and the transversality condition Ψ(0) = 0,




in the neighbourhood of {Λ∗,Γ∗} that generates a
trajectory converging towards {L∗I ,Λ
∗,Γ∗,Ψ∗} by means of damped oscillations. Specifically, the
values of Λ(0) and Γ (0) should be selected to satisfy the transversality conditions in (7) and (13)
by placing the system in (14) exactly on the stable branch of the saddle point {L∗I ,Λ
∗,Γ∗,Ψ∗}.
In the remainder of the paper, the stable saddle path followed by LI (t), Λ (t), Γ (t), Ψ (t),
and, implicitly, by wI (t) and LE (t), will be taken as the perfect-foresight path of the model
economy and it will be explored numerically.
3 Quantitative implications
In order to offer a quantitative assessment of the dynamic properties of the insider-outsider
model developed in the previous Section, I resort now to some numerical simulations. Conse-
quently, I provide a suitable calibration for the model economy. Thereafter, I show how the
insider labour force, its wage and the number of entrants evolve over time by shaping the paths
of union membership and union wage premia. Moreover, I explore the role of discounting in
the determination of steady-state solutions. All the MATLAB codes used below are available
from the author upon request.
3.1 Calibration
Following Shimer (2005), I map the period of the model economy into quarterly figures. There-
after, for reasons of data availability, the theoretical setting is calibrated by taking as reference
the US economy. Despite the lower unionization rate with respect to European countries, the
applicability of the insider-outsider theory to the US labour market is explicitly acknowledged
by Solow (1985) as well as by Lindbeck and Snower (2002).
In detail, the values of the two discount rates, i.e. ρF and ρU , are taken from Giammarioli
(2003) who provides parameter values for a non-Walrasian dynamic model of the labour market
developed in continuous time.11 The separation rate is set according to the JOLT-based estima-
tions retrieved by Shimer (2005). Thereafter, the transformation rate of entrants into insiders
is set is order to replicate the union membership rate observed over the last twenty years, i.e.
m/ (m+ 0.10) = 12.43% (cf. Hirsh and Macpherson, 2016). The implied value of the trans-
formation rate reveals that the large majority of entrants lose their job just after one instant
of employment. At the outset of the game, the consequent outflow pattern would appear to
be consistent with an implausible high value of the unemployment rate. As argued by Zanetti
(2007) and Cole and Rogerson (1999), however, a rationale for that high unemployment can be
given by assuming that non-confirmed entrants are unconstructive searchers, i.e. individuals
11A similar value for the discount rate is also used in the continuous-time union model set forth by Alvarez
and Shimer (2014).
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that look for a job just to claim unemployment benefits whose continued employment is not
profitable for the firm (cf. Coe and Snower, 1997; Guerrazzi and Ksebi, 2019).
Moreover, the slope of labour demand is calibrated by means of the value of the capital
share provided by Kydland and Prescott (1982). The hypothesis underlying the calibration
of α is that the production function in eq. (2) can be seen as the integration of log-linear
demand schedules for insiders and outsiders. The productivity differential between insiders
and outsiders is fixed according to the US union wage premium estimated by Blanchflower and
Bryson (2004). The figure of the reservation wage is set according to the point estimation of
the US replacement rate provided by van Vliet and Caminada (2012). The slope of marginal
turnover costs is set at an intermediate level among figures provided by Oi (1962) and Barron
et al. (1985). Union’s preferences are calibrated according to the estimates derived by Pencavel
(1985) for a large sample of Swedish firms. Taking into account the increasing path of R&D
expenditure observed in the US over the last twenty years, the employment orientation implied
by the retrieved value of β can be exploited to describe the rent-seeking behaviour of unions
also in that country (cf. Nair-Reichert, 2000). Finally, the value of TFP is calibrated in order
to replicate the chosen union wage premium, i.e. wE/w
∗
I = φ = 0.83. In this way, 1/φ becomes
a measure of the equilibrium degree of monopoly held by the union of insiders in the wage
setting process.
The whole set of parameter values and their respective description is given in Table 1.
PARAMETER DESCRIPTION VALUE
ρF Firm’s discount rate 0.0300
ρU Union’s discount rate 0.0300
b Separation rate 0.1000
m Transformation rate 0.0142
φ Productivity differential 0.8300
α Labour demand slope 0.3600
wE Reservation wage 0.5700
h Slope of marginal hiring costs 0.2850
β Union’s employment weight 0.6490
A TFP 0.8344
Table 1: Calibration
The parameter values in Table 1 lead to the following steady-state solutions: L∗I = 0.0303,
Λ∗ = 1.0525, Γ∗ = 163.5066 and Ψ∗ = −0.5112. Those figures imply that w∗I = 0.6867 and L
∗
E =
0.2132, whereas the two convergent roots are equal respectively to λ1 = −0.1071+ 0.0395i and
λ2 = −0.1071− 0.0395i. An interesting feature of the model economy disclosed by the baseline
calibration is that in the stationary equilibrium the instantaneous marginal productivities of
the two categories of workers are strictly positive and higher than the respective retributions.




E > wE. Such a pattern is standard in dynamic models in
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which employment adjustments are subject to labour turnover costs and in the present context
it is the consequence of the fact that the optimal recruiting policy of the firm – summarized by
the actual value of L∗E – has to consider the payment of the implied hiring costs (cf. Bertola,
1992).
3.2 The dynamics of LI, LE and wI
As I argued above, in the neighbourhood of {L∗I ,Λ
∗,Γ∗,Ψ∗} the dynamic system in (14) is
characterized by complex saddle-path dynamics. Let V (λ1) and V (λ2) be the eigenvectors
associated, respectively, to the convergent roots λ1 and λ2. In our case, V (λ1) and V (λ2) are
4× 1 arrays whose components may be real and/or complex. Thereafter, following Stemp and
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Φ (Da, Db, λ1, t)
Ω (Da, Db, λ2, t)
)
Da, Db ∈ ℜ (25)
where Φ (Da, Db, λ1, t) and Ω (Da, Db, λ2, t) are given, respectively, by
(
Φ (Da, Db, λ1)




(Da + iDb) exp (Re (λ1)) (cos (Im (λ1) t) + i sin (Im (λ1) t))
(Da − iDb) exp (Re (λ2)) (cos (Im (λ2) t)− i sin (Im (λ2) t))
)
(26)
Setting the values of the two constants Da and Db consistently with the selected initial
condition for LI (t) and Ψ (t), eq. (25) provides the real-valued solutions LI (t), Λ (t), Γ (t)
and Ψ (t) that are necessary to derive the evolution over time of LE (t) and wI (t). The two
elements in the array (26) clearly show that the analytical solution of the dynamic system
in (21) has cyclical properties in the sense that LI (t), LE (t) and wI (t) converge to their
respective steady-state references by means of damped oscillations whose amplitude depends
on the absolute values of the imaginary parts of λ1 and λ2.
Fixing Da = 5.325 (6.2058), Db = −32.3534 (−32.1900) in (25) and exploiting the param-
eters values collected in Table 1, we have that Ψ (0) = 0 whereas LI (0) is 1% above (below)
L∗I .
12 Thereafter, the implied trajectories of LI (left scale), LE (left scale) and wI (right scale)
in terms of the respective deviations from steady-state values are plotted in the two panels of
Figure 2, where in the panel on the left (right) the initial value of the stock of insiders starts
1% above (below) L∗I .
12In order to have a trajectory for wI (t) with positive values only, Da and Db are fixed to meet the transver-
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—— LE
Figure 2: Saddle path adjustments of LI , LE and wI
The two plots in Figure 2 shows that when the insider labour force (the black curve) starts
1% above or below its steady-state value the flow of entrants (the grey curve) jumps about
30% below its steady-state reference whereas the insider wage (the dashed curve), consistently
with the theoretical findings outlined in Section 2, deeply overshoots its stationary level. The
insensibility to initial conditions displayed by the model is due to the aggressive rent-seeking
behaviour undertaken by the union at the beginning of the game that shapes in a very marked
way the dynamics of insider wages.
These simulation results illustrated above suggest four general conclusions. First, the stock
of incumbents and their wage tend to move in opposite directions during the adjustment process
towards the stationary solution. This means that along the convergence path towards the
steady-state the union of insiders trades off higher wages against lower membership and vice-
versa (cf. Delacroix, 2006). Second, keeping the stock of incumbents as well as the flow
of entrants below their stationary references, the union is able to negotiate an insider wage
that remains above its steady-state value during the whole adjustment process. This finding
implies a continuum decline of the union wage premium and resembles the one obtained by
Zanetti (2006) in his efficient bargaining model where a reduction in the labour input results
in an upward wage pressure. Third, between the two categories of workers, out-of-equilibrium
adjustments tend to involve more the flow of non-unionized workers than the stock of insiders.
Specifically, there is threshold – around 10% below its steady-state value – under which the stock
of incumbents does not fall whereas the flow of entrants undershoot its stationary reference of
about 30%. That latter finding is somehow related to the sustained turnover rate that involves
entrant workers, but it is also ascribable to the optimal wage policy of the union that leads
the firm to delay new hirings (cf. Kugler and Saint-Paul, 2000). As argued by Blanchard
and Summers (1986), the union of insiders exerts its wage pressure to exclude disenfranchised
outsiders. Moreover, corroborating findings retrieved in dynamic and static insider-outsider
modes, the oscillations towards the steady-state generated by the differential game descrived
above display a significant asymmetric pattern (cf. Huizinga and Schiantarelli, 1992; Begg et
al. 1989).
The fact that at the beginning of the game the stock of incumbents as well as the flow
of entrants tend to undershoot their steady-state values has intriguing implications for the
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dynamics of the membership rate. Specifically, as shown in Figure 3, the theoretical model is











































Figure 3: Membership dynamics, actual data and simulated trajectory
The plot in Figure 3 – together with the one in Figure 2 – reveals that the recent dynamics
of US industrial relations, where the decline in union membership paralleled the reduction of
union wage premia, can be interpreted as the outcome of the optimal behaviour of corporative
unions that pushed up insider wages by restraining the expansion of output and employment (cf.
Alvarez and Shimer, 2014). In fact, the insider-outsider conflict prevailing in the labour market
may have rendered the incumbent labour force a form of firm-specific capital that remained
subject to a severe hold up problem (cf. Oi 1962; Krusell and Rudanko, 2016). Consequently,
the reduction of production induced by the rent-seeking behaviour carried out by unionized
insiders can be pointed out as one of the factors that, in the long run, triggered the reduction
of union membership and union wage premia (cf. Blanchflower and Bryon, 2004).
3.3 The impatience of the firm and the one of insiders
A remarkable feature of the differential game developed in Section 2 is that it allows to consider
how the degree of impatience of the firm and the one of unionized insiders affects the equilibrium
values of the different variables of the model economy. With regard to the literature reviewed
in the introduction, this aspect may be of some interest since it is usually assumed that workers
and firms discount future stream of income at the same rates (cf. Solow, 1985; Krusell and
Rudanko, 2016). Through this channel, the model offers a possible rationale on how interest
rates may directly affect labour market outcomes.
Taking different values for ρF and fixing the other parameters at the values collected in













0.01 0.0332 0.6037 0.2338
0.02 0.0316 0.6457 0.2225
0.03 0.0303 0.6867 0.2132
0.04 0.0291 0.7268 0.2053
0.05 0.0282 0.7663 0.1985




E for different values of ρF
Consistently with the findings outlined, respectively, by Binmore et al. (1986) and Osborne
and Rubinstein (1990) within dynamic wage bargaining models, the numerical results displayed
in Table 2 reveal that the higher (lower) the impatience of the single player, the lower (higher)
its labour market power. Specifically, for higher (lower) values of ρF , the insider wage increases
(decreases) while the stock of incumbents as well as the flow of entrants decrease (increase).
Therefore, the lower (higher) the values of L∗I and L
∗
E and the lower (higher) the values of w
∗
I ,
the lower (higher) the profits of the firm achieved in the stationary equilibrium. Interestingly,
these findings hold no matter the employment- or the wage-orientation of the insider union, i.e.
they do not depend on the actual value of β and they can also be easily framed in a more general
setting where produced output is obtained not only by means of labour but even with the use of
physical capital. Lower discount rates on the side of the firm are usually associated with lower
interest rates that may lead entrepreneurs to substitute labour for capital. Obviously, when
the labour input becomes less important in the production process because of the adoption
of new automation technologies, the influence of unions is seriously undermined (cf. Dosi and
Virgillito, 2019).
4 Concluding remarks
In this paper, I develop a differential insider-outsider game with continuous time and infinite
horizon. Specifically, I set forth an analytically tractable dynamic model in which a union
of corporative insiders is called in to choose the common trajectory of the wage paid to its
members by taking into account the optimal hiring policy of a firm that, in turn, is assumed to
decide the number of outsiders that has to be hired in a spot labour market characterized by the
existence of quadratic hiring costs (cf. Solow, 1985; Lindbeck and Snower, 1989; Hamermesh,
1995).
Assuming that incumbents cannot be fired and commit themselves to a given path of wages,
the implementation of the maximum principle reveals the possibility to find out an open-loop
Stackelberg equilibrium in which the initial stock of incumbents – supplemented by a trasver-
sality condition on the shadow value that incumbents attach to their marginal contribution to
firm’s profits – pins down the trajectories of the insider labour force, the one of entrants as
well as the one of insider wages. The structure of the game reveals the non-trivial fact that
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the union of internal workers is actually able to control the firm problem, i.e. the union sets a
wage for its members that leads the firm to hire a number of entrants that is consistent with
the welfare of the union itself (cf. Dockner et al. 2000; Krussel and Rudanko, 2016).
Numerical simulations obtained by calibrating the model according to selected features of
the US economy show that adjustments towards the steady-state equilibrium occur through
damped asymmetric oscillations that offer some insights on the simultaneous decline of union
membership and union wage premia observed over the last twenty years (cf. Blanchflower
and Bryson, 2004). Furthermore, consistently with dynamic models of wage bargaining, the
theoretical framework developed above conveys a positive equilibrium relation between the
labour market power of insiders and the rate of interest used by the firm to discount future
profits (cf. Binmore et al. 1986; Osborne and Rubinstein, 1990).
From a more general perspective, the path of union membership implied by the model as
well as its positive equilibrium relationship between firms’ discount rates and union power may
be helpful in understanding the extent of the deregulation wave that hit labour, output and
financial markets in the 80s and the 90s. Compressing the profits of productive firms, the ag-
gressive rent-seeking behaviour of unions slowed down economic growth and this naturally led
to a reduction of their density and their influence for the consequent impossibility to grant to
unionized workers improved opportunities in terms of wages and employment in a long-run per-
spective. Under this scenario, unions had serious problems in resisting to the disempowerment
of labour market institutions induced by the free trade interventions promoted by public au-
thorities throughout the different sectors of the economy. Such a traumatic tendency, however,
has been somehow strengthened even by the shrink of union power implied by the reduction
of discount rates triggered by the fall of interest rates that initially occurred during the Great
Moderation and then exacerbated some years after by the easy-money policies carried out by
central banks in the afterwards of the Great Recession. Overall, together with the widespread
adoption of capital-intensive production technologies, this may explain the reason why nowa-
days the position of trade unions in the wage setting process and the political arena is so
compromised (cf. Dosi and Virgillito, 2019).
Appendix: Controllability of the firm problem
Consider the first two differential equations of the dynamic system in (14). They read as
·









Taking into account eq. (10), the system of autonomous differential equations in (A.1) can
































where wI (t) is the control of the union.






−1 − (b+ ρF )
]
(A.3)
Since H has full rank, i.e. rank (H) = 2, the problem of the firm is controllable by the
union.
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